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11 Introduction
Recent research has established that economies with fully rational agents and
market clearing can be subject to endogenous °uctuations (see the surveys
by Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Day and Panigiani (1991), Boldrin and
Woodford (1990)). Equilibrium trajectories in dynamic general equilibrium
models can exhibit not only deterministic cycles but also chaotic behavior.
This line of research provides an explanation of business cycle °uctuations
that is fully self-contained in the style of the axiomatic tradition of general
equilibrium theory as all °uctuations are equilibrium consequences of fully
speci¯ed general equilibrium models. However, an issue with this literature
is that chaotic trajectories emerge for parametric values that do not con-
form with the calibrated values that are usually used in the macroeconomic
literature.
In this paper we show that chaotic dynamics can arise in a model of
economic growth for a wider class of productions functions than the ones
used in the literature so far. Secondly, chaotic dynamics (ergodic chaos and
geometric sensitivity1) can occur for low levels of impatience in general two-
sector economic growth models. Thirdly, ergodic chaos can occur for di®erent
con¯guration of the factor intensity. We show that ergodic chaos can occur
when there is factor intensity reversal, and in addition in the case of non-
linear utility if the consumption good sector is capital intensive for all values
of the growth factor.
The model we study is a two sector growth model with Harrod-Neutral
technical change or labour augmenting externalities. This is the same frame-
work used by Drugeon and Venditti (1998), Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti
(2003) and Goenka and Poulsen (2004) to study indeterminacy. In the two-
sector model, sector 1 produces a pure consumption good while sector 2
produces a pure investment good. In addition to the labor and capital in-
puts provided by the representative consumer, each sectors' productivity is
a®ected by the aggregate capital stock. This provides a positive externality
in the production of both sectors through learning by doing. The class of
utility functions is the CES family. This speci¯cation is consistent with the
existence of a balanced growth path.
To establish ergodic chaos we show that a suitably de¯ned map of the
1In our model there is ergodic chaos if and only if there is geometric sensitivity. Thus,
for brevity, we refer to the chaotic dynamics as ergodic chaos.
2growth factor of capital (growth rate minus 1) can be unimodal and expan-
sive. Di®erent su±cient conditions are obtained depending on whether the
utility function is non-linear or non-linear. A su±cient condition in the ¯rst
case for unimodality is that either there is factor intensity reversal or the
consumption good sector is capital intensive. We show that a necessary and
su±cient condition for the law of motion to be expansive is that the rate of
impatience of the representative consumer is not too low. In the second case,
the su±cient condition for unimodality holds only if there is factor intensity
reversal.
Our results extend what is known in the literature as we work with general
functional forms. Nishimura and Yano (1995, 2000) and Nishimura et.al.
(1994) also establish ergodic chaos in a two-sector growth model but the
production functions in both sectors are Leontief; in Boldrin et.al. (2001)
the production function in the consumption good sector is Cobb-Douglas and
the production function in the investment good sector is linear. All we need
to assume is that the production functions in both sectors are homogenous of
degree one with respect to private inputs and that external e®ects are labor
augmenting.
The result that ergodic chaos is compatible with low impatience is similar
to the results obtained by Nishimura and Yano (1995, 2000) and Nishimura
et al. (1994). (This work moves away from the so-called \minimum im-
patience theorems" (Mitra (1996) and Nishimura and Yano (1996), Sorger
(1992, 1994)) which show that topological chaos is not feasible in optimal
growth models unless the representative consumer discounts future utilities
very heavily.) They derive su±cient conditions on the parameters of a family
of optimal growth models that give rise to an ergodic chaotic optimal pol-
icy function for all discount factor inside the unit interval. Nishimura and
Yano's (2000) have a constructive example establishing chaos. Nishimura,
Sorger and Yano (1994) have a more general approach which relies on wealth
e®ects. The utility of the representative consumer depends on the consump-
tion good as well as current stock. This is similar to Majumdar and Mitra
(1994) who have a general result based on wealth e®ects. In our model we do
not have wealth e®ects but have the classical learning by doing externality
which is Harrod Neutral or labour augmenting. There are some other di®er-
ences in the nature of results. First, we derive an upper bound on the rate
of impatience of the representative consumer. The Transversality Condition
3(TVC) imposes a restriction on the discount factor2 relating to the maximum
feasible growth factor, the depreciation rate, and the exponent of the util-
ity function. If growth is bounded and there is full depreciation, the model
exhibits ergodic chaos for all discount factors arbitrarily close to unity. If
growth is unbounded, there exists, as in Boldrin et al. (2001), an inverse re-
lationship between discounting and growth. As long as the discount factor is
inside the range of values allowed by the TVC, ergodic chaos can be obtained
without further restrictions on the level of impatience of the representative
consumer. In Boldrin et al. (2001) the upper bound on the discount rate
can be lower than the bound derived in our paper for certain range of the
external e®ects. Second, we derive a lower bound on the rate of impatience
that is related to the underlying economic fundamentals.
The result on capital intensity con¯gurations allows us to establish a link
between the results of Boldrin et al. (2001), Nishimura and Yano (1995,
2000), Nishimura et al. (1994) and the earlier literature on chaos in two-
sector neoclassical growth models. In all these papers the capital intensity
in both sectors are arbitrarily chosen. The unimodal map is also derived
from speci¯c functional forms when no factor intensity reversal takes place
between sectors. In the earlier literature on neoclassical growth, factor in-
tensity reversal is a necessary condition for the emergence of topological
chaos, as shown by Deneckere and Pelikan (1986), Boldrin (1989), Boldrin
and Deneckere (1990). In our model when utility is nonlinear, unless the
consumption sector is always capital intensive, capital intensity reversal is
necessary for the emergence of chaos. If utility is linear capital intensity
reversal is necessary for chaos. Furthermore, unlike the earlier literature on
neoclassical growth models which had topological chaos, we have ergodic
chaos in our model. In Nishimura and Yano (1995, 2000) and Nishimura et
al. (1994) the consumption goods sector is always capital intensive and there
is ergodic chaos.
It is worth noting that the work of Nishimura and Yano (1995, 2000) and
Nishimura et al. (1994) uses corner solutions to establish a non-monotonic
map that is essential for chaos. In our model the boundary behaviour is not
the driving force to generate the non-monotonic dynamics.
We study the backward dynamics of the model as the map describing the
dynamics is non-invertible in the forward dynamics. This problem also arises
2The discount factor can be rewritten as ¯ = 1=(1+½); where ½ > 0 is the rate of time
preference or the rate of impatience of the representative consumer.
4in overlapping generations models (see e.g. Grandmont (1985), and Goenka,
Kelly and Spear (1998) which has a discussion of this issue).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model and do some preliminary analysis. Section 3 collects some results on
chaos to make the discussion self-contained. Then we study the case of linear
utility in section 4. Section 5 contains the results for non-linear utility. The
intuition of the results and further discussion of the results are in section 6.
2 The Model
The model is a discrete time, two{sector growth model with Harrod-Neutral
technical change. Consumers are indexed by h and are distributed along the







; 0 < ® · 1
where ct is per capita consumption at time t.
Consumers discount lifetime utility by the discount factor ¯, where, 0 <
¯ < 1. Each consumer h 2 [0;1] is initially endowed with an equal fraction
of the aggregate capital stock k: Consumers also supply a single unit of labor
inelastically. This labor is allocated between the two productive sectors of
the economy. The aggregate labor supply in the economy is unity.
There are two productive sectors in the economy. Sector 1 produces the
consumption good, ct: Sector 2 produces the investment good, yt. Inputs,
capital, k, and labor, l, are freely mobile between sectors. Capital is assumed
to depreciate at rate ± 2 (0;1]. Thus, kt+1 = yt + (1 ¡ ±)kt. Market clearing













t denotes the amount of private inputs used in sector, i = 1;2:
We will omit the time subscripts whenever they are not necessary. The








The productivity of the private inputs is a®ected by the aggregate capital
stock X; where X =
R 1
0 k(h)dh. Thus, it is a two-sector version of the
learning-by-doing model (Arrow (1961), Sheshinski (1967), Romer (1986)).
We make the standard assumption that for a given level of the aggregate
capital stock the marginal productivities of both inputs are positive and
there are diminishing marginal productivities in private inputs.
Assumption 2: For i = 1;2, F i : <3
+ ! <+, are continuous functions. For
a given X 2 <+:
1. F i(:;:;:) is C3 on <++ £ <++ £ <+;
2. F i(:;:;X) is homogenous of degree one and strictly increasing over
<++ £ <++;
3. F i









While we work with general production functions, the key restriction in
our model is the nature of the externality.








iX); where i = 1;2;
where Fi(:;:) is homogenous of degree 1 in ki and liX:
We de¯ne the growth factor of capital °t as °t = kt+1=kt: Under As-
sumption 3, it follows that the maximum feasible growth factor ° is equal
6to F2(1;1) + (1 ¡ ±): As capital may not depreciate fully in every period,
the minimum feasible growth factor ° is (1 ¡ ±): Hence for all feasible se-
quences of capital fkt;kt+1g given by (1¡±)kt · kt+1 · F2(kt;Xt)+(1¡±)kt;
°t 2 [(1 ¡ ±);F2(1;1) + (1 ¡ ±)] ´ ¡:









































t ¸ 0; l
i
t ¸ 0; fXtg
1
t=0, k0 given:
The constraints can be collapsed using the production possibility frontier
(PPF from here on), T(k;y;X), given by ct = F1(kt ¡ k2(k;y;X);Xt(1 ¡













(1 ¡ ±)kt · kt+1 · F





t=0 denote the solution to this problem: If fktg1
t=0 satis¯es
ktfXtg1
t=0 = Xt for all t ¸ 0; then the path fktg1
t=0 will be referred to as an
equilibrium path. This ¯xed point problem is solved in a di®erent framework
in detail by Romer (1983) and Mitra (1998). We do not address this issue
here. We assume for simplicity that there exists an equilibrium path fktg1
t=0
such that ktfXtg1
t=0 = Xt for all t ¸ 0:
7As we are working with general technologies, we make the following reg-
ularity assumption3
Assumption 4 : T(kt;yt;Xt) is C3 on <++ £ <++ £ <+:
On de¯ning the indirect utility function as V (kt;kt+1;Xt) = [T(kt;kt+1;Xt)®=®];












The set of feasible solutions to (4) D(Xt) is de¯ned as follows:
D(Xt) = f(kt;kt+1) 2 <+ £ <+ : (1 ¡ ±)kt · kt+1 · F
2(kt;Xt) + (1 ¡ ±)ktg:
This set is non-empty and convex. Following Boldrin et. al (2001), fktg1
t=0
is an interior solution to Problem 4 if the following conditions are satis¯ed:








tV (kt;kt+1;Xt) < 1: (7)
Equation (5) is the Euler equation. Equation (6) is the transversality
condition. Equation (7) is the summability condition. Conditions (5) to (7)
are the same as conditions (3.1)-(3.3) given in Boldrin et. al (2001) with the
exception that u(ct) is non-linear. To insure that the transversality condition
(TVC) is satis¯ed we impose the following restriction
3It is satis¯ed in the case of Cobb-Douglas production functions, among others.
8Assumption 5: ¯(F2(1;1) + (1 ¡ ±))® ´ ¯°® < 1:
For unbounded growth we need to assume that ° > 1: In that case we
see that the TVC will be satis¯ed for all ¯ 2 (0;1=°®): For bounded growth
° < 1, and if there is full depreciation, then TVC holds for all ¯ 2 (0;1): If
® is small enough then the TVC will also hold for all ¯ even if there isn't full
depreciation. For a ¯xed °, there is a inverse relationship between ® and the
upper-bound on ¯ for the TVC to be satis¯ed.
The simplest dynamics in the model arise in when there is a balanced
growth path or when capital grows at a constant rate.
De¯nition 1 An equilibrium path fktg is a balanced growth path (BGP) if
there exists a growth factor ° 2 [0;°] such that for all t ¸ 0; kt = °tk0; where
k0 6= 0:
The issue is whether there exists an interior solution with such a property.
If F2
1(k2(1;1);l2(1;1)) < 1, i.e., there is bounded growth, there exists a BGP.
For the case of unbounded growth is the following additional assumption has
to be made :
Assumption 6 : ¯ [F2
1(k2(1;±;1);l2(1;±;1)) + 1 ¡ ±] > 1:
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1-6 be satis¯ed. Then there exists an inte-
rior BGP with unbounded growth, e ° 2 (1;°):
Proof. See Goenka and Poulsen (2004).
We are interested in the dynamics of the model. These are given by (5)
- (7). To study general dynamics in the model, instead of working with this
system of equations, we want to transform these to obtain a one dimensional
di®erence equation which will be more amenable to analysis.
In order to do so, it is helpful to investigate properties of the Production
Possibility Frontier. Under Harrod-Neutrality, Drugeon and Venditti (1998)
show that the input demand functions ki(kt;yt;Xt) and li(kt;yt;Xt); i =
1;2; are homogenous of degree 1 and 0 respectively and that T(kt;yt;Xt)
is homogenous of degree 1. Then using the homogeneity properties of the
production functions, Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti (2003) establish the
following:
9Lemma 1 Let Assumptions 2-3 be satis¯ed. Then, function of T(k;y;X);




















































Proof. See Drugeon and Venditti (1998) and Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti
(2003).
We also see from this result that the sign of T21 depends on the factor
intensity. With factor intensity reversal, T21 will change sign. A similar result
can also be found in Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) in a two-sector optimal
growth model without externalities.
Under Harrod -Neutrality, the Euler equation can now be represented in
terms of the growth factor, °t as the homogeneity properties of the PPF
imply that the indirect utility function is homogenous of degree ®:
Lemma 2 Let Assumptions 1-3 be satis¯ed. Then V (kt;kt+1;Xt) is homoge-
nous of degree ®: Furthermore, the Euler equation (5) reduces to:
°
1¡®
t V2(1;°t;1) + ¯V1(1;°t+1;1) = 0: (11)
Proof. See Drugeon and Venditti (1998).
Recall that the set of feasible growth factors is ¡ = [(1¡±);F2(1;1)+(1¡
±)]. We want to represent the general forward dynamics as map ¿ : ¡ ! ¡,
°t+1 = ¿(°t) (12)
or, in backward dynamics as a map, µ : ¡ ! ¡:
°t = µ(°t+1): (13)
10From (11) we can de¯ne the following two functions:




and so (11) can be written as
¡g(°t) + f(°t+1) = 0:
To obtain a ¯rst order di®erence equation like (12) or (13), we need to show
that either g or f has a well de¯ned inverse on [°;°]: This is taken up in
section 4 for the linear utility and in section 5 for non-linear utility.
3 Results on chaos
To make the discussion self contained, some standard results and de¯nitions
on the theory of chaos in dynamical systems are collected here (see Collet
and Eckmann (1980), Day (1994) and Eckmann and Ruelle (1985) for more
details). We focus on chaos in the sense of ergodic oscillations and geometric
sensitivity (GS). In other words, the law of motion is generated by a nonlinear
di®erence equation with no random terms such that (i) the long run behavior
of the system is characterized by extremely complicated aperiodic dynamics,
(ii) small di®erences in the initial conditions are magni¯ed at a geometric
rate for arbitrary ¯nite lengths of time (GS) and (iii) the time average of the
orbit can be replaced by the space average (ergodic chaos).
A dynamical system is a pair (I;µ) where I is a compact interval on the
real line and is called the state space and µ a function describing the law of
motion of the state variable x 2 I. Thus, if xt is the state of the system in
period t; then xt+1 = µ(xt) is the state of the system in period t + 1. If we
denote by x0 the initial state of the system, and µ0(x) = x for all x 2 I then
µt+1(x) = µ(µt(x)) for all t ¸ 0 and all x 2 I where µt is the t ¡ th iterate of
µ, t = 0;1;2;:::
The notion of chaos that is often used in the economics literature is that of
topological chaos. In many models this is easy to establish using the theorem
of Li and Yorke (1975) that a \cycle of period 3 implies chaos." (also see
Mitra (2001) for a di®erent set of conditions to establish topological chaos).
De¯nition 2 Let µ : I ! I de¯ne a dynamical system. We say that µ
exhibits topological chaos if:
111. For every period N, there exist points xN 2 I such that µN(xN) = xN.
2. There exists an uncountable set S ½ I and an ² > 0 such that every
pair x;y in S with x 6= y:
(a) limn!1 supjµn(x) ¡ µn(y)j ¸ ².
(b) limn!1 inf jµn(x) ¡ µn(y)j = 0:
(c) For every periodic point z and x 2 S: limn!1 supjµn(x) ¡ µn(z)j ¸
².
While topological chaos can often be easy to show, S may have Lebesgue
measure zero. For example, for the quadratic map µ(x) = ¹x(1 ¡ x) with
¹ 2 [1;4], there is topological chaos if ¹ = 3:828427, but almost all initial
conditions lead to a cycle of period 3. A di®erent notion of chaos is the
following.
De¯nition 3 (Nishimura and Yano (2000)). The dynamical system (I;µ);
exhibits Geometric Sensitivity (GS) if there exists a constant h > 1 such
that for any ¿ ¸ 0 there exists " > 0 such that for all x and x0 2 I with
jxt ¡ x0








t jx ¡ x
0j:
In this case small di®erences in initial conditions magnify geometrically
over time. As I is bounded, the geometric magni¯cation of the e®ects of
a small perturbation cannot last inde¯nitely. Furthermore, the dynamical
system (I;µ) has no locally stable cyclical path.
There is also the notion of ergodic chaos. Ergodic chaos is a stronger
property than topological chaos in the sense that it is \observable chaos".
Let ¨ be a ¾-algebra on I. 4 De¯ne a probability measure ¹ : ¨ ! <+
such that (i) ¹(?) = 0 and (ii) ¹([1
n=0Yn) = §1
n=0¹(Yn); (iii) ¹(I) = 1,
where fYtg1
n=0 is a countable collection of disjoint sets in ¨. The probability
measure ¹ is said to be invariant with respect to µ if ¹(µ¡1(Y )) = ¹(Y ) for
all Y 2 ¨: Invariant measures have an important property.
4A ¾¡algebra is a collection of subsets ¨ of I such that (i) I is inside ¨; (ii) the
complement of any set Y included in ¨ is also in ¨; (iii) the union of any countable
collection of subsets in ¨ is inside ¨:
12Theorem 1 (Poincar¶ e Recurrence Theorem:) Let fI;¨;¹g be a prob-
ability space and let ¹ be invariant under µ. Let Y be any measurable set of
positive measure. Then all points of Y return to Y in¯nitely often.
Consider x 2 Y . Then, x 2 µ¡1(x) ) µ(x) 2 Y . Thus, the trajectory will
stay in Y forever. The invariant probability measure ¹ is said to be ergodic
if for some Y 2 ¨ then µ¡1(Y ) = Y implies either ¹(Y ) = 0 or ¹(Y ) = 1:
In other words, the system cannot split into non-trivial parts. For ergodic
measures, a fundamental result is:
Theorem 2 (The Birkho®-von Neuman Mean Ergodic Theorem:)
Let (I;µ) be a dynamical system. If ¹ is an invariant and ergodic probability












for almost all x 2 I:
The left hand side of (15) is the average value of g along the orbit
fx; µ(x);:::g: The right hand side of (15) is the expected value of g eval-
uated on I. In other words, the time averages along an orbit fx; µ(x);:::g
can be replaced by space averages. Furthermore, for almost all x 2 I; an
orbit fx; µ(x);:::g will visit every measurable set proportionally to its mea-
sure. The system is \chaotic" if the support of the measure is a \large set."
However, the measure could be concentrated on a point as in the case of a
¯xed point, or on a ¯nite subset of points in the case of a cycle. Absolute
continuity of a measure avoids this problem.
De¯nition 4 The probability measure ¹ is absolutely continuous with respect






for all measurable sets Y in ¾¡algebra ¨:
Absolute continuity implies that for all Y 2 ¨; if L(Y ) = 0 then ¹(Y ) = 0:
Thus, the support of ¹ cannot be a set of measure zero.
We can now de¯ne the concepts of ergodic chaos in the following way:
13De¯nition 5 The dynamical system (I;µ) exhibits ergodic chaos if there ex-
ists a probability measure ¹ on I which is absolutely continuous, invariant
and ergodic.
Lasota and Yorke (1973) establish that if µ is a piecewise C2 and expansive
mapping then there exists an absolutely continuous invariant measure
De¯nition 6 A mapping µ de¯ned on [a;b] is piecewise C2 and expansive if:
1. There exists a ¯nite set x0 = a < x1 < x2 < ::: < xn = b,
2. For all j = 0;1;:::;n, µ is C2 on (xj;xj+1) and can be extended as a C2
function to [xj;xj+1];
3. jµ0(x)j ¸ h > 1 for all x 2 (xj;xj+1):
Li and Yorke (1978) show that if µ is also a unimodal map then this
measure is ergodic.
De¯nition 7 Assume there exits a constant c 2 [a;b]; a < c < b: Then a
mapping µ; de¯ned on [a;b] is unimodal if
1. µ is continuous on [a;b];
2. µ is strictly increasing on (a;c) and strictly deceasing on (c;b):
Nishimura and Yano (2000) establish that a map that is expansive is also
chaotic in the sense of GS. Thus, we have:
Theorem 3 (Lasota and Yorke (1973), Li and Yorke (1978), Nishimura and
Yano (2000)):
Let (I;µ) be a dynamical system. If µ : I ! I is expansive and unimodal
then µ is chaotic in the sense of ergodic oscillations and GS.
4 Linear Utility
We ¯rst study the case where ® = 1 or utility is linear and there is full
depreciation, i.e. ± = 1. In this case charaterizing the dynamics simpli¯es
considerably and factor intensity reversal is necessary for the occurrence of
chaos. Full depreciation will imply that [°;°] = [0;F2(1;1)].
14In the model, there can in general be several capital intensities where
factor intensity reversal takes place. We make the simplifying assumption
that there exists a unique value of the growth factor b °; where 0 < b ° < °; at
which factor reversal takes place. 5
Assumption 7: (Unicity of factor intensity reversal) There exists a







Under linear utility, fktg1
t=0 is an equilibrium path if and only if the
following conditions are satis¯ed








tT(kt;kt+1;kt) < 1: (18)
Conditions (16) to (18) are identical to conditions (3.1)-(3.3) given in
Boldrin et. al (2001). Given assumptions 2 and 3, these can be satis¯ed only
for an interior trajectory, i.e., with k1
t > 0; k2
t > 0.
The homogeneity properties of the PPF imply that the left hand side of
equation (16) can be rewritten as
Ã(°t;°t+1) ´ T2(1;°t;1) + ¯T1(1;°t+1;1) (19)
or, as
Ã(°t;°t+1) = 0: (20)
5One can relax this assumption and still show that µ is chaotic in the sense of ergodic
oscillations and GS. To do so, one would need to (i) establish that µ is piecewise strictly
monotonic, piecewise C2 and expansive on the following intervals (0;b °1);(b °1;b °2);:::and
(b °n;°); where b °j, j = 1;:::n; denotes a growth factor at which the ith factor reversal
occurs. (ii) Show that µ(b °j); ;j = 1;:::n; is a turning point and that b °j¡1 < b °j < b °j+1:
For more details for this case, see Theorem 8.5 and Corollaries 8.3 and 8.4 in Day (1994) .
15From (19), we can de¯ne the following two functions:
f(°t+1) = ¯T1(1;°t+1;1); (21)
g(°t) = ¡T2(1;°t;1)
and hence, (19) can be written as
¡g(°t) + f(°t+1) = 0: (22)
To obtain a ¯rst order di®erence equation such as (12) or (13) either g or f
has to have a well de¯ned one-to-one inverse on [0;°]: As we can see from
(8) in Lemma 1, T12 changes sign if factor intensity reversal takes place at
b °. Hence f does not have a well de¯ned one-to-one inverse. The same is not
true for the existence of g¡1:
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1-5 and 7 be satis¯ed. Then there exists a
1 ¡ 1 map µ : [0;°] ! [0;°] such that
°t = µ(°t+1): (23)
Proof.
De¯ne
f(°t+1) = ¯T1(1;°t+1;1); (24)
g(°t) = ¡T2(1;°t;1); (25)
where f : [0;°] ! J v <¤
+ and g : [0;°] ! I v <¤
+:
Using (24) and (25), the Euler equation (19) can be written as ¡g(°t) +
f(°t+1) = 0: Assumptions 2, 3 and the unicity of factor intensity reversal
(Assumption 7) imply that g0 > 0 for all °t 2 (0;b °) [ (b °;°): Furthermore,
Assumption 7 implies there is a unique b °; 0 < b ° < ° such that g0(b °) = 0.
Hence g is one to one. From the de¯nition of g we see that range(g) = I: So
g has a well de¯ned inverse g¡1: We can rewrite (20) as °t = µ(°t+1); where
g¡1 [f(°t+1)]: From this de¯nition, it follows that µ : [0;°] ! [0;°]:
Grandmont (1985), Goenka, Kelly and Spear (1998), amongst others, also
study backward foresight dynamics. In Grandmont (1985) the same problem
about the non-existence of the inverse of f. In his overlapping generations
model, the excess demand function of the young consumers is a unimodal
16function if the Arrow-Pratt relative degree of risk aversion of the old is a
non-decreasing function of their wealth. See Goenka, Kelly and Spear (1998)
for a discussion of forward and backward dynamics.
The issue of showing chaos in the model thus reduces to showing that the
map µ derived in section 4 is unimodal and expansive.
4.1 Unimodality of µ
To establish the unimodality of µ we need to show µ is continuous on [0;°];
strictly monotonically increasing on (0;b °) and strictly monotonically decreas-
ing on (b °;°): It can be shown that the sign of µ
0(°t) depends on the sign of
T12: As T12 changes sign at the point of factor intensity reversal, under unic-
ity of factor intensity reversal µ
0(°t) changes sign only once at b °. Hence µ is
either strictly monotonically increasing on (0;b °) and strictly monotonically
decreasing on (b °;°) or strictly monotonically decreasing on (0;b °) and strictly
monotonically increasing on (b °;°): Which of these two cases prevails depends
on which sector is the most capital intensive on (0;b °): Given the de¯nition
of unimodality we need the capital good sector to be more capital intensive








for all °t+1 2 [0;b °).
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1-5 and 8 be satis¯ed. Let µ : [0;°] ! [0;°]
be de¯ned as in (23). Then, unicity of factor intensity reversal (Assumption
7) is a necessary and su±cient condition for µ to be unimodal.
Proof.
(i) Continuity of µ. From the de¯nition of µ given in Proposition 2, µ is
continuous as the composite function of two continuous functions.
(ii) Monotonicity of µ: Let Assumptions 1-8 be satis¯ed. Then using the
inverse function theorem we can derive µ







17Upon inspection of (26) we see that the sign of the denominator depends on
the sign of ¡T22. Looking at (10), we see that under Assumption 7 ¡T22 > 0
for all °t 2 (1;b °)[(b °;°): Hence µ
0(°t+1) ? 0 if and only if T12(1;°t+1;1) ? 0:
Assumptions 7 and 8, together with the results of Lemma 1, imply that
µ
0
(°t+1) > 0 for all °t+1 2 (0;b °)and µ
0
(°t+1) < 0 for all °t+1 2 (b °;°):
The result that factor intensity reversal is a necessary condition for the
occurrence of cycle or chaotic dynamics is not new. Benhabib and Nishimura
(1985) establish that factor intensity reversal is a necessary condition for the
emergence of a cycle of period two in an optimal growth model. Deneckere
and Pelikan (1986), Boldrin (1989) and Boldrin and Deneckere (1990) show
that intensity factor reversal is a necessary condition for the occurrence of
topological chaos. However, to our knowledge, no such result has yet been
established in models with endogenous growth or in model of optimal growth
in which ergodic oscillations occur for low levels of impatience.
4.2 Expansiveness of µ and chaos
In the next Proposition we show that a necessary and su±cient condition
for µ to be expansive is that the discount factor lies within a given interval.
As explained above, the lower bound on the discount factor means that the
representative consumer must not be too impatient. The upper bound on
the discount factor imposed by the TVC is only binding if one assumes that
growth is unbounded.
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 1-5, 7, and 8 be satis¯ed.










¯ < 1 for all °t+1 2 (0;b °) [ (b °;°): (27)
A necessary and su±cient condition for µ : [0;°] ! [0;°] to be expansive is


























From the de¯nition of µ it follows that µ is twice continuously di®eren-





¯ > 1 for all



















































For the transversality condition to be satis¯ed, ¯° < 1. As ° = F2(1;1);




Condition (27) can be interpreted as follows. Applying the envelope the-
orem to the ¯rst order conditions of Problem (3) we obtain T2 = ¡q: Hence
T21 = ¡@q=@k and T22 = ¡@q=@y: So, (27) states that the rate of change
of the shadow price of investment with respect to the current capital cap-
ital stock must be greater than the rate of change of the shadow price of
investment with respect to last period's stock of investment.
Collecting the previous two propositions we have the main result.
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 1-5, 7, and 8 be satis¯ed. µ : [0;°] ! [0;°]










¯ < 1 for all °t+1 2 (0;b °) [ (b °;°) holds.
(ii) The discount factor ¯ satis¯es ¯ 2 (¯min;¯max):
5 Non Linear Utility
To the study the non-linear utility case (® < 1), we ¯rst establish the follow-
ing results.
19Lemma 3 Let Assumptions 1-5 be satis¯ed. Then:
V21 = (® ¡ 1)T
®¡2[T1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T2]T2 + T
®¡1[T21 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T22]; (28)
V23 = T
®¡2 [(® ¡ 1)T2T3 + TT23]: (29)
Furthermore, no matter which sector is the most capital intensive, V21+V23 ¸
0 for all °t 2 (°;°):
Proof. By de¯nition V (kt;kt+1;Xt) = [T(kt;kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt;Xt)]
® =®: Un-
der Assumption 4 we can compute the following derivative: V2 = T ®¡1T2;
V21 = (® ¡ 1)T ®¡2[T1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T2]T2 + T ®¡1[T21 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T22] and V23 =
T ®¡2 [(® ¡ 1)T2T3 + TT23]: Using the expressions of V21 and V23; we get:
V21 +V23 = (®¡1)T
®¡2[T1 ¡(1¡±)T2 +T3]T2 +T
®¡1[T21 ¡(1¡±)T22 +T23]

















































Substituting (31), (32) and (33) into (34), and using (30), we get
T3 = qF
2
2 > 0: (34)
We now determine the sign of T21 + T23: Using (10), we have













20Under Assumption 2, 2l2(F1
12 +qF2
12)=F2
1 > 0: It follows that V21 +V23 >
0 if T21 + T23 > 0: And T21 + T23 > 0 if T21 (1 ¡ k1=l1X) ¸ 0: So, if




































We can see from (8) that when the consumption good sector is more
capital intensive for all °t 2 [0;°]; then T12 < 0: The sign of V21 is ambiguous.
So, if V21 changes sign at some value of ° 2 [0;°]; then f does not have a
well de¯ned inverse. If one assumes that factor intensity reversal takes place
V21 may also change sign. 6; 7
Lemma 4 Let Assumptions 1-5 be satis¯ed. Then there exists a map µ de-
¯ned from [°;°] onto [°;°]; such that
°t = µ(°t+1): (35)
Proof. De¯ne




6With full depreciation, i.e. for ± = 1 looking at the expression for V21 derived in
Lemma 3 we see that V21 can become negative if utility is not too concave, i.e. for ® close
to unity.
With partial depreciation, i.e. for ° < ± < 1 V21 = T®¡2(® ¡ 1)T2[T1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T2] +
T®¡1[T21 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T22]:
For V21to be negative we need both:
(i) ¡T21 > (1 ¡ ±)T22 and
(ii) ¡ T[T21 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T22] > (® ¡ 1)T2[T1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)T2].
7Assumption 6 holds for a simple economic example. If c = (k1)¾(l1X)1¡¾ and y =
(k2)1=2(l2X)1=2 then b ° = 1: In this case it can be shown that if k1=l1 > k2=l2 there exists
0
° 2 [0;°] such that V21(1;
0
°;1) = 0: Full request of this statement can be obtained on
request.
21where f : [°;°] ! J v <¤
+ and g : [°;°] ! I v <¤
+:
Using (36) and (37), the Euler equation (5) can be written as ¡g(°t) +
f(°t+1) = 0:
g
0 = (1 ¡ ®)°
¡®
t V2(1;°t;1) + °
1¡®V22(1;°t;1): (38)
From the Euler theorem on homogenous functions we have
(® ¡ 1)V2(1;°t;1) = V21(1;°t;1) + V22(1;°t;1)°t + V23(1;°t;1):
Hence
g
0 = V21(1;°;1) + V23(1;°;1) > 0
g is one to one. From the de¯nition of g we see that range(g) = I: Thus, g
has a well de¯ned inverse g¡1: We can rewrite (38) as °t = µ(°t+1); where
g¡1 [f(°t+1)]: From this de¯nition, it follows that µ : [°;°] ! [°;°]:
It can be shown that the sign of µ
0(°t) depends on the sign of V12:
Lemma 5 Let Assumptions 1-5 be satis¯ed. Let µ : [°;°] ! [°;°] be de¯ned








Under the results of Lemma 3 it follows that µ
0(°t+1) ? 0 if and only if
V12(1;°t+1;1) ? 0: If the investment good sector is more capital intensive, we
see from Lemmas 1 and 3 that V12(1;°t+1;1) > 0 for all °t+1 2 [°;b °): However
the results of Lemmas 1 and 3 indicate that the sign of V12 is ambiguous for
°t+1 2 [°;b °): Factor intensity reversal does not guarantee the unimodality of
µ
0(°t). We ¯rst make the following assumption:
Assumption 9 : There exists a unique
0
°; where 0 <
0
° < °; such that
V21 changes sign at
0
°:
225.1 Unimodality of µ
To establish the unimodality of µ we need to show µ is continuous on [°;°];
strictly monotonically increasing on some open interval (°;°¤) ½ [°;°] and
strictly monotonically decreasing on the interval (°¤;°) ½ [°;°]:
Lemma 6 Let Assumptions 1-5 and 9 be satis¯ed. Let µ : [°;°] ! [°;°] be
de¯ned as in (35). Then, µ is unimodal if one of the following holds.
(i) Factor reversal occurs once at some ^ ° 2 (°;°).
(ii) For all °t 2 (°;°) the consumption good sector is capital intensive:
Proof. :
From the de¯nition of µ given in Lemma 4, µ is continuous as a composite
function of two continuous functions.
(i) Suppose ¯rst that for all °t+1 2 [°;b °) the capital good sector is more







From Lemma 5 we know that µ
0(°t+1) ? 0 if and only if V12(1;°t+1;1) ? 0.







then it follows that T21 > 0, V21 > 0 and µ
0(°t+1) > 0 for all °t+1 2 [°;b °):
Under Assumption 9 there exists a unique
0
°; where ° <
0
° < °; such that
V21 changes sign at
0
°: It follows that V12(1;°t+1;1) < 0 and that µ
0(°t+1) < 0
for all °t+1 2 (
0
°;°): A necessary condition to be true is that T21(1;
0
°;1) < 0:















Factor reversal has happened at
0






for all °t+1 2 (
0
°;°):
23(ii) Suppose now that for all °t+1 2 [°;°] the consumption good sector is







From Lemma 5 we know that µ
0(°t+1) ? 0 if and only if V12(1;°t+1;1) ? 0.
Under Assumption 9 there exists a unique
0
°; where ° <
0
° < °; such that
V21 changes sign at
0
°: It follows that V12(1;°t+1;1) ? 0 for °t+1 2 (
0
°;°]:
Suppose that V12(1;°t+1;1) < 0 for °t+1 2 (
0
°;°].and that V12(1;°t+1;1) > 0
for °t+1 2 [°;
0
°): It follows that µ




0(°t+1) > 0 for all °t+1[°;
0
°). The same argument can be used to prove that
µ
0(°t+1) > 0 for all °t+1 2 (
0
°;°) and that µ
0(°t+1) < 0 for all °t+1[°;
0
°) if one
assume that V12(1;°t+1;1) > 0 for °t+1 2 (
0
°;°] and that V12(1;°t+1;1) < 0
for °t+1 2 [°;
0
°).
In other words, unicity of factor reversal is no longer a necessary and suf-
¯cient condition for the unimodality of µ: An alternative su±cient condition
for unimodality is that the consumption good sector is capital intensive for
all °t 2 [0;°] and that Assumption 9 is satis¯ed. A similar result is obtained
in Nishimura and Yano (1995, 2000) and Nishimura et.al. (1994).
5.2 Expansiveness of µ; and chaos
In this section we show that if the discount factor is bounded below then
the slope of µ is everywhere greater than unity for all feasible values of the
growth factor: We then establish the main result on ergodic oscillations and
geometric sensitivity.
Lemma 7 Let Assumptions 1-5 and 9 be satis¯ed. Then a necessary condi-










¯ < 1 for all °t+1 2 (°;b °)[(b °;°): (39)
24A necessary and su±cient condition for µ : [°;°] ! [°;°] to be expansive is

















Proof. From the de¯nition of µ it follows that µ is twice continuously dif-





¯ > 1 for all








































Collecting these results together we have the following result.
Proposition 6 Let Assumptions 1-5 and 9 be satis¯ed. µ : [°;°] ! [°;°] is
chaotic both in the sense of ergodic oscillations and geometric sensitivity if
the following four conditions hold:
(i) Either there is factor intensity reversal atleast once or the consumption
sector is always capital intensive,
(ii) V21 changes sign once,
(iii) (39) is satis¯ed for all °t+1 2 (0;b °) [ (b °;°) and
(iv) The discount factor ¯ satis¯es ¯ 2 (¯min;¯max).
256 Conclusion
The intuition of the result is as follows (see Benhabib and Nishimura (1985)
and Reichlin (1997)). It is easiest to see it in the case of full discounting. At
time t, set k = kt and y = kt+1. An oscillating trajectory will have: kt <
yt = kt+1 > yt+1 = kt+2. This possibility can arise when the consumption
sector is more capital intensive or if there is capital intensity reversal. To
induce the oscillation, we need
1. An increase of the capital stock from kt to kt+1 > kt (a shift outward
of the PPF)
2. to generate a fall of the investment output from yt to yt+1 < yt
3. and a rise of consumption from ct to ct+1 > ct.
The Rybczynski Theorem tells us that an ncrease in a sector's endowment
of a factor will cause an increase in output of the good which uses that
factor intensively, and a decrease in the output of the other good. Under
the Rybczynski theorem, this can happen if the consumption sector is more
capital intensive than the investment sector.
What about factor intensity reversal? Consider two periods where kt+1 >
kt. Then the Rybczynski theorem will imply that the capital stock will be
increasing. At some time market clearing and static e±ciency will imply that
the it is desirable to increase consumption output and decrease investment
output. This will happen when there is a factor intensity reversal.
This is the intuition for having a 2-period cycle. Having externalities
introduces an additional non-linearity so that there can be chaos where there
were only cycles. The Harrod-Neutrality is important as the homogeneity
properties enable us to get a characterization of the dynamics.
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